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SEARCHING FOR ADEQUATE
ACCOUNTABILITY: SUPERVISORY PRIESTS
AND THE CHURCH’S CHILD SEX ABUSE
CRISIS
BENJAMIN D. WASSERMAN†
ABSTRACT
In 2002, the Boston Globe published a report exposing child sex
abuse by priests and a cover-up by supervisory priests. Supervisory
priests—church officials who supervise lower-ranking priests—
concealed reports of sexual abuse by lower-ranking priests and created
substantial risks of sexual abuse to children. Prosecutors tried to hold
supervisory priests accountable by turning to statutes that either did not
capture the moral culpability of priests, like statutes prohibiting
obstruction of justice or contributing to the delinquency of a minor; or
that did not legally encompass their misconduct, like childendangerment statutes. Child endangerment captures the moral
culpability of supervisory priests’ misconduct, but child-endangerment
statutes based on the Model Penal Code (MPC) do not legally cover
supervisory priests or their acts. Though supervisory priests chose to
suppress reports of child sex abuse, prosecutors cannot constitutionally
shoehorn misconduct into statutes—like child endangerment—that
were never before interpreted to apply to individuals like supervisory
priests. Instead of breaching the supervisory priests’ constitutionally
guaranteed notice that their conduct constituted child endangerment,
prosecutors should encourage state legislatures to: 1) extend statutes of
limitations for crimes against minors and include clergy as mandatory
reporters; 2) amend child-endangerment statutes to include supervisory
priests and those similarly situated; and 3) criminalize the reckless
creation of a substantial risk of child sex abuse, and the reckless failure
to alleviate that risk when there is a duty to do so. Absent legislative
action, prosecutors should use statutes that represent a lesser degree of
moral culpability, such as contributing to the delinquency of a minor
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or mandatory-reporter statutes. Enacting statutes that both legally
encompass and adequately reflect the blameworthiness of supervisory
priests will hopefully deter similar misconduct and protect children
from sex abuse in institutional settings.

INTRODUCTION
On September 27, 2015, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Pope
Francis told victims of child sexual abuse by Catholic priests that all
responsible will be “held accountable.”1 But to whom and to what type
of accountability was the pope referring? Even though the Catholic
Church’s (Church) child sex abuse scandal was exposed by the Boston
Globe in 2002,2 pervasive child sexual abuse by priests continues, with
over 2000 new credible, substantiated3 allegations since 2010.4
Achieving accountability measures for the priests’ victims through the
U.S. criminal-justice system has proved easier said than done.
Problems holding individuals accountable have been especially
prevalent with the prosecution of high-ranking supervisory priests,

1. Pope Francis, Remarks of the Pope Francis for Philadelphia Meeting with Survivors 1,
http://www.usccb.org/about/leadership/holy-see/francis/papal-visit-2015/mediaresources/upload/papal-visit-2015-meeting-with-survivors.pdf [https://perma.cc/43JF-3S56].
2. Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 6,
2002), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowed-abuse-priest
-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html [https://perma.cc/T3NM-4HG4].
3. Credible allegations are defined as “those that have been substantiated by a preliminary
investigation [by the relevant diocese, eparchy, or religious institute] and would be eligible to be
sent to Rome according to Canons 1717 and 1719.” Id. at 61, 63 (emphasis omitted). Canon 1717
relates to when a church official should undertake a preliminary investigation for a suspected
violation of Canon Law and certain duties of the official undertaking the investigation. 1983
CODE c.1717. Canon 1719 requires that the results of the preliminary investigation be kept secret
if they are not necessary for the Church’s penal process. 1983 CODE c.1719. To determine the
credibility of a sexual abuse allegation against a church official, “[e]very diocese and eparchy
follows a process . . . as set forth in canon law and [Articles 4 and 5 of] the Charter for the
Protections of Children and Young People.” U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 2015
ANNUAL REPORT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 36 (2016) [hereinafter
2015 ANNUAL REPORT] (citing U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 7–8 (2002)).
4. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 36–37, 42–43 (listing 180 new credible,
substantiated allegations of sexual abuse of a minor in 2014 and 213 in 2015); U.S. CONFERENCE
OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: REPORT
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG
PEOPLE 26, 32, 35, 41 (2014) [hereinafter 2013 ANNUAL REPORT] (listing 424 new credible,
substantiated allegations of sexual abuse of a minor in 2010, 532 in 2011, 411 in 2012, and 391 in
2013).
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such as bishops, archbishops, and parish leaders.5 Supervisory priests
are typically bishops or other “diocesan leaders [who are] responsible
for the care of [other] priests whose ability to carry out their
responsibilities in ministry is impaired by physical or psychological
illness,” such as sexual behavior with a minor.6 Supervisory priests
often “received . . . report[s] of sexual abuse of a minor by a priest of
the diocese [and chose] how to respond to the victim and family and
how to make choices about a course of action for the priest involved.”7
After receiving reports of abuse by lower-ranking priests—typically
pastors, associate pastors, or resident priests8—supervisory priests
sometimes “transferred known abusers to other parishes . . . where
their reputations were not known . . . in direct conflict with [clinicians’]
advice,” “misled [parishioners about] the reason for the abuser’s
transfer,” “tried to keep their files devoid of incriminating evidence,”
“rarely provided information to local civil authorities and sometimes
made concerted efforts to prevent reports . . . from reaching law
enforcement.”9 By doing so, supervisory priests provided abusive
priests with “a continuing supply of victims.”10
5. While this Note focuses on the conduct of supervisory priests, it applies to all people who
supervise others and use the contact their work with children affords them to abuse children. In
this Note, I choose to focus specifically on the Church scandal because (1) the Boston Globe
reports in 2002 caused a wave of reaction throughout the United States, and the ensuing
prosecutions of supervisory priests offer an illustrative snapshot of how states with similar statutes
employed them differently to address supervisory priests’ conduct, and (2) the high-profile nature
of the Church’s sex abuse crisis provides a readily understandable vehicle through which to
explore the egregious conduct of supervisors of individuals who abuse children and the dearth of
adequate statutes with which to prosecute them.
6. KAREN J. TERRY, MARGARET LELAND SMITH, KATARINA SCHUTH, JAMES R. KELLY,
BRENDA VOLLMAN, & CHRISTINA MASSEY, JOHN JAY COLL. RESEARCH TEAM, THE CAUSES
AND CONTEXT OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1950–2010, at 76 (U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops 2011) [hereinafter 2011 JOHN JAY
REPORT].
7. Id.; see also Report of the Grand Jury at 43, In re Cty. Investigating Grand Jury XXIII,
Misc. No. 0009901-2008 (Ct. Com. Pl. Crim. Div. Pa. 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Philadelphia GJ
Report] (noting that a supervisory priest had a responsibility “to investigate any allegations of
sexual abuse by priests, . . . [and] make sure that no priest with a history of sexual abuse of minors
was recommended for assignments, much less for assignments with continued access to
children”).
8. JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SEXUAL ABUSE
OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1950–2002, at 79 (U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops 2004) [hereinafter 2004 JOHN JAY REPORT] (noting that
approximately 77.8 percent of offending Church officials were serving as pastors, associate
pastors, or resident priests when the abuse was alleged to have occurred).
9. 2011 JOHN JAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 89.
10. 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 44; Report of the Grand Jury at 6, In re
Cty. Investigating Grand Jury of September 26, 2001, Misc. No. 01-00-8944 (Ct. Com. Pl. Crim.
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In light of the pervasive child sex abuse by priests, this Note
analyzes the various methods that states have embraced to hold
supervisory priests accountable. After acknowledging that the delayed
reporting of sexual abuse by victims led to the expiration of the statute
of limitations for many claims, this Note examines instances in which
states have used statutes that criminalize obstruction of justice,
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, failure to report suspected
child abuse in violation of a duty, and child endangerment to prosecute
supervisory priests and the Church. Jurisdictions that extracted
concessions from supervisory priests should be applauded; however,
not all of the statutes employed to prosecute them adequately capture
their conduct. Either the statute used fails to capture the moral desert
of supervisory priests—as with obstruction of justice, contributing to
the delinquency of a minor, and mandatory reporting—or the statute
does not legally encompass the misconduct of supervisory priests, as
with child endangerment. After describing the circumstances in which
two jurisdictions successfully used child-endangerment statutes based
on the Model Penal Code (MPC) against supervisory priests and
churches, this Note argues that those jurisdictions were wrong to do so
because child-endangerment statutes based on the MPC do not legally
encompass supervisory priests or their conduct. Lastly, this Note
suggests other potential methods of prosecuting supervisory priests.
Prosecutions involving child sex abuse in the Archdiocese of
Philadelphia provide a striking example of the problem with holding
supervisory priests accountable under child-endangerment statutes.
Prosecutors from the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office sought to
hold a supervisory priest, Monseigneur William Lynn, Secretary for
Clergy for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia,11 accountable for his role
in the crisis by seeking charges against him for child endangerment.12
Pennsylvania’s child-endangerment statute was modeled on the MPC
statute for endangering the welfare of children, which criminalizes
“violat[ing] . . . a duty of care [of a parent, guardian, or other person
supervising the welfare of a child] that endangers the child.”13 The

Div. Pa. 2003) [hereinafter 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT] (“[Supervisory priests] most
directly put children at risk when they knowingly permitted priests whom they knew, or were
substantially certain, had sexually abused children to have continuing access to children.”).
11. Commonwealth v. Lynn, 83 A.3d 434, 437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
12. 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 2–3.
13. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980); see also 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 cmt. Joint State Government
Commission (1967) (“This section is derived from Section 230.4 of the Model Penal Code.”).
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Philadelphia grand jury agreed that “[i]n the common sense of the
term, the actions of the church hierarchy clearly constituted
endangerment of the welfare of children,” but decided it could not
charge Msgr. Lynn under the statute.14 The grand jury concluded that
the child-endangerment statute was “too narrow to support a
successful prosecution of the decisionmakers who were running the
Archdiocese” because “[h]igh-level Archdiocese officials . . . were far
removed from any direct contact with children.”15
After finding that the child-endangerment statute can apply only
when a person with a duty of care directly supervised the abused child,
consistent with Pennsylvania precedent,16 the grand jury recommended
statutory amendments to cover this conduct in future prosecutions.17 In
2006, with the district attorney’s blessing, the Pennsylvania legislature
took the grand jury’s recommendations, extending the statute of
limitations18 and expanding the class of individuals covered by the
statute to include “a person that employs or supervises . . . a person”
who supervises a child’s welfare.19
The Philadelphia district attorney sought to indict Msgr. Lynn
again in 2011 after previously unknown instances of child sexual abuse
Compare 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (West 2006) (“A parent, guardian or other
person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age commits an offense if he knowingly
endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support.”), with
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (“A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a
child under 18 commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly endangers the child’s welfare by violating
a duty of care, protection or support.”).
14. Report of the Grand Jury at 65, In re Cty. Investigating Grand Jury of September 17,
2003, Misc. No. 03-00-239 (Ct. Com. Pl. Crim. Div. Pa. 2005) [hereinafter 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ
REPORT]. The 2005 Philadelphia GJ Report was actually a continuation of a report started by a
2003 Philadelphia grand jury, which was “unable to complete [its] investigation before the
expiration of the term” for several reasons, including “the magnitude of the abuse, the complexity
of the issues presented, the large number of clerics accused of molesting children, [and] the
enormous number of victims.” 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 14–15.
15. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 65 (emphasis added).
16. See Lynn, 83 A.3d at 450 (noting that “neither [the Superior Court] nor [the] Supreme
Court ha[d] ever affirmed a conviction for [child endangerment] where the accused was not
actually engaged in the supervision of, or was responsible for supervising, the endangered child”).
17. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 69–76. The grand jury argued that
amending the child-endangerment statute to include those who supervise individuals who directly
supervise and abuse children would criminalize “endangerment as a course of conduct” and would
“clarify that even a person who does not directly come into contact with a child may nevertheless
be supervising the welfare of the child in a very real sense.” Id. at 72.
18. Act of Nov. 29, 2006, No. 179, 2006 Pa. Laws 1586 (codified as amended at 42 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552(c)(3) (West 2007)).
19. Id. at 1581 (codified as amended at 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1)
(West 2007)).
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came to light.20 The alleged abuse was more recent than the prior
alleged conduct, but the pre-amendment version of the statute applied
because even the more recent allegations occurred before the statute
was amended.21 Contrary to the 2005 grand jury’s interpretation of the
child-endangerment statute, the 2011 grand jury indicted Msgr. Lynn
after applying the same law to substantially similar facts.22 In fact, the
2011 grand jury “d[id] not hesitate to conclude that the Archdiocese
understood itself to be responsible for ‘supervising the welfare’ of the
students . . . entrusted to its care.”23 It concluded that “Msgr. Lynn had
a duty . . . [and] was responsible for supervising [children’s] welfare
with respect to abusive priests.”24 After a trial in 2012, a jury convicted
Msgr. Lynn of endangering the welfare of children when he breached
that duty by knowingly supervising priests who sexually abused
children and failing to protect the children.25
But on appeal the following year, a Pennsylvania Superior Court
judge overturned Msgr. Lynn’s conviction.26 Just as the 2005 grand jury
had declined to indict because the statute was written too narrowly to
include supervisory priests,27 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
concluded that the statute required “actual supervision of children to
be an element of the offense.”28 Because Msgr. Lynn had “had no direct
involvement with the child, [and] never met [nor] knew the child,”29 the
court deemed him to be outside the scope of the statute.30 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed, reinstating Msgr. Lynn’s
conviction in April 2015.31 The Court declared that only the “welfare”
of the child needs to be supervised32 and that there is no limit on how

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
2015).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 112–17.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Lynn, 83 A.3d 434, 445 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), rev’d, 114 A.3d 796 (Pa.
Id. at 453–54.
2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 65.
Lynn, 83 A.3d at 452.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 453–54.
Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 827 (Pa. 2015).
Id. at 823.
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far removed a supervising individual can be from the child to be
covered by the statute.33
These striking disagreements in the Pennsylvania courts and the
reversal by the 2011 grand jury exemplify the uncertainty about the
applicability of child-endangerment statutes to supervisory priests.
Driven by public pressure and an overwhelming desire to hold
supervisory priests accountable, prosecutors and courts may be
shoehorning conduct into legally inadequate statutes. Even though
supervisory priests recklessly enabled other clergy to sexually abuse
children for decades,34 it is unconstitutional to convict them under an
interpretation of a child-endangerment statute based on the MPC that
represents “an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of
narrow and precise statutory language,” depriving supervisory priests
“the right of fair warning.”35
Apart from prosecutions of supervisory priests, prosecutors used
supervisory priests’ conduct as the basis for plea agreements with
individual churches. Several state prosecutions, including those in New

33. Id. at 824 (“[T]he requirement of supervision is not limited to only certain forms of
supervision, such as direct or actual . . . . By its plain terms it encompasses all forms of supervision
of a child’s welfare.”).
34. Despite their enablement of abusive priests, supervisory priests cannot be criminally
charged as accomplices to the sexual abuse itself. Accomplice liability requires that the individual
has “the purpose of promoting or facilitating” the offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)
(AM. LAW INST. 2001) (emphasis added); see id. (describing the elements required to qualify as
an accomplice). Here, the offense to which the supervisory priest would be an accomplice is child
sex abuse; however, supervisory priests did not have the specific intent to sexually abuse children.
As one grand jury report that analyzed supervisory priests as accomplices noted, “While the
actions of the Archdiocese leaders clearly facilitated rapes and other sexual offenses, and ensured
that more would occur, the evidence . . . did not demonstrate that the leaders acted with the
specific goal of causing additional sexual violations.” 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note
14, at 64–65 (emphasis added).
35. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964); see also United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (“The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct
is forbidden by the statute. . . . [N]o man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which
he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.”).
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Hampshire,36 Minnesota,37 Missouri,38 and Ohio,39 used respondeat
superior liability to obtain pleas from churches themselves instead of
from supervisory priests. Institutions can typically be held vicariously
liable for the actions of their employees through the theory of
respondeat superior.40 For the Church entity to be liable for the crimes
of its employees, the employees must act within the scope of their
employment with intent to benefit the entity.41 A supervisory priest
who failed to act on reports of child sex abuse would have acted within
the scope of his employment because it was his responsibility to hear
reports of inappropriate behavior and supervise lower-ranking
priests.42 And such a supervisory priest would have intended to benefit
the Church by concealing the reports because he wanted to protect the
reputation of the Church and the abusive priest from the allegations.43
36. Agreement at 14–15, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 02-S-1154 (N.H. Super. Ct. 2002)
[hereinafter 2002 New Hampshire Agreement].
37. Gross Misdemeanor Criminal Complaint, State v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul and
Minneapolis, No. 2139124 (Dist. Ct. 2d Jud. Dist. Minn. 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Minnesota
Complaint].
38. Closed Indictment, State v. Finn, Police No. 11-033224 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Crim. Div. 2011)
[hereinafter 2011 Missouri Indictment].
39. Laurie Goodstein, Archdiocese of Cincinnati Fined in Sex Abuse Scandal, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/21/us/archdiocese-of-cincinnati-fined-in-sexabuse-scandal.html [http://perma.cc/G8K4-8RPG].
40. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909).
41. Id.
42. For further discussion of supervisory priest responsibilities over lower-ranking priests,
see supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., PETER W. HEED, N. WILLIAM DELKER & JAMES D. ROSENBERG, NEW
HAMPSHIRE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DIOCESE
OF MANCHESTER 97 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT] (recounting a
diocesan response to an allegation of child sex abuse, which stated that “[m]aking those problems
public would destroy [the offending priest’s] ability to contribute further [to the Church]” and
“going public now with the [abuse allegations] would . . . jeopardize [the offending priest’s]
limited ministry, to no constructive end”); id. at 133 (describing statements by a diocesan official
related to sexual abuse allegations against a priest and noting that the diocese “w[as] not really
looking . . . for any publicity” and “wanted this to be something . . . that [it] could handle . . . and
it would be quiet”); 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 3 (finding that despite
their awareness of priests who posed a danger to children, “these Archdiocesan managers
continued and/or established policies that made the protection of the Church from ‘scandal’ more
important than the protection of children from sexual predators”); see also APRIL ‘E’ 2002
WESTCHESTER CTY. GRAND JURY, REPORT OF THE APRIL ‘E’ 2002 WESTCHESTER COUNTY
GRAND JURY CONCERNING COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL ABUSE AND MISCONDUCT AGAINST
MINORS BY MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY 7 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ
REPORT] (inferring that the supervisory priests’ failure to act on allegations of child sex abuse
“was an orchestrated effort to protect abusing clergy members from investigation, arrest and
prosecution . . . [and to] protect[] the religious institution from adverse publicity that might have
affected its economic welfare”); 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 43 (finding that a
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Because any church plea is merely an extension of the supervisory
priest’s criminal conduct, a plea or conviction of a church based on
supervisory priests’ conduct is treated here in the same light as if it were
a conviction of a supervisory priest.
This Note argues that although child-endangerment statutes are
the only statutes used to prosecute supervisory priests that adequately
reflect their moral culpability, child-endangerment statutes based on
the MPC do not legally encompass supervisory priests’ conduct.
Holding supervisory priests liable under those statutes is an
unconstitutional attempt to shoehorn morally reprehensible conduct
into a statute that was not meant to—and legally does not—apply to
that class of individuals. Such shoehorning by states like Pennsylvania
breaches the Constitution’s notice requirement for criminal conduct to
achieve accountability for misconduct by supervisory priests.
But there are better approaches to holding these priests
accountable. In light of the legal insufficiency of child-endangerment
statutes, states should employ the following strategies to prosecute
supervisory priests now and for future conduct: (1) extend or eliminate
statutes of limitations for crimes involving the abuse of minors and
include clergy as mandatory reporters of child abuse; (2) amend childendangerment statutes to cover the conduct of supervisory priests and
other similarly situated individuals; (3) pass statutes, like those in
Massachusetts, that criminalize the reckless creation of a substantial
risk of child sex abuse and the failure to alleviate that risk;44 and (4) as
a last resort, use existing statutes that cover the conduct of supervisory
priests but do not reflect their moral blameworthiness, such as
mandatory-reporting and delinquency statutes.
Part I of this Note provides a brief background of the Church’s sex
abuse crisis and profiles state criminal investigations into child sex
abuse by priests. This Part evaluates the purposes of and moral
culpability associated with different statutes used to hold supervisory
priests and churches liable for their roles in the crisis. Part II focuses
on the use of child-endangerment statutes based on the MPC to
prosecute supervisory priests and churches and argues that those
supervisory priest purposefully abdicated his responsibility to protect children from sexual abuse
by priests so that “the Archdiocese was spared public exposure or costly lawsuits”); OFFICE OF
THE ATT’Y GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF PA., A REPORT OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH STATEWIDE
INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY 6, 12 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT]
(“[Supervisory priests] took actions that further endangered children as they placed their desire
to avoid public scandal [and protect the institution] over the wellbeing of innocent children.”).
44. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13L (West 2015).
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statutes reflect the moral culpability of supervisory priests but do not
legally cover their conduct. Part III offers prescriptions for holding
supervisory priests accountable in the future by suggesting
amendments and new statutes that more effectively target the conduct
of supervisory priests. Part IV concludes by encouraging state
legislatures to enact statutes that legally encompass the conduct of
supervisory priests and result in punishments that reflect the
seriousness of their actions.
I. STATE PROSECUTIONS OF SUPERVISORY PRIESTS
A. Background
Between 1950 and 2002, there were 10,667 individual reports of
sexual abuse in the United States against 4392 different priests.45
Despite the overwhelming number of reports by the end of 2002, just
14 percent of those abusers were referred to the police, resulting in
criminal convictions in only 3 percent of cases.46 Approximately one
third of the 10,667 abuse reports were made in 2002 alone, up from
fewer than three hundred each year for the previous five years.47 This
striking surge in sex abuse reports in 2002 was likely the product of an
investigative series published by the Boston Globe48 into reports of
child sex abuse by Father John Geoghan of the Archdiocese of
Boston.49 With reports of child sex abuse in the Church thrust into the
national consciousness, prosecutors around the country were
determined to hold Church officials accountable.
Prosecutors sought to charge not only the priests who engaged in
abuse but also supervisory priests who knew of abuse and who denied,
concealed, and enabled it. These supervisory priests were responsible
for “investigat[ing] any allegations of sexual abuse by priests . . . [and]
mak[ing] sure that no priest with a history of sexual abuse of minors
was recommended for assignments.”50 Instead of fulfilling these duties,

45. 2011 JOHN JAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 27.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id. at 9.
48. See id. at 6.
49. Rezendes, supra note 2. The uncovering of the abuse and the Boston Globe’s
investigative reports were most recently profiled in the critically acclaimed film, SPOTLIGHT
(Anonymous Content 2015). The continued focus on the Church sex abuse scandal, especially in
pop culture, reflects how prominent the crisis still is in America’s national consciousness.
50. E.g., 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 43. For further discussion of
supervisory priest responsibilities, see supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
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they routinely suppressed reports of abuse and “passively allow[ed] the
molesters to remain in positions where they could continue to prey on
children.”51 Worse, “[w]hen victims complained or scandal
threatened,” supervisory priests recommended transferring the
abusive priests to new parishes52 “where unsuspecting parents and
teachers would entrust children to their care.”53
State and local prosecutors called for grand jury investigations and
issued attorneys general reports detailing supervisory priest conduct
and analyzing possible prosecution strategies. District attorneys and
state attorneys general in at least nine states have sought to hold
supervisory priests or churches criminally liable for their roles in
enabling child sexual abuse.54 The first grand jury investigation of a
supervisory priest was opened in Westchester County, New York, on
April 29, 2002,55 just four months after the Boston Globe published the
initial investigative reports.56 The public pressure arising from the flood
of child sex abuse reports led state and local prosecutors to turn to a
variety of different statutes to hold the supervisory priests and

51. E.g., 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 43.
52. E.g., id.; see also David Gibson, The Bishop and the Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/07/opinion/the-bishop-and-the-prosecutor.html
[https://perma.cc/CER4-SUXA] (“In exchange for immunity from prosecution, Bishop O’Brien
admitted that several times during his 22-year tenure he placed children in harm’s way by
transferring priests who had been accused of sexual abuse to parishes, and that he never informed
either the priests’ new superiors or parishioners.” (emphasis omitted)). For further discussion of
how supervisory priests responded to allegations of sexual abuse by lower-ranking priests, see
supra note 43 and accompanying text. Cf. 2011 JOHN JAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 81 (noting that
from 1950–2003, just 8.5 percent of priests who allegedly sexually abused children were required
to resign or retire).
53. 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 45; see, e.g., G. STEVEN ROWE, STATE OF
MAINE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., A REPORT BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN BY PRIESTS AND OTHER CLERGY MEMBERS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN MAINE 11 (2004) [hereinafter 2004
MAINE AG REPORT] (describing an instance where an abusive priest was transferred to a new
parish, but the diocese “did not notify the [new] parish of the past allegations”); 2002
WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 7–8 (finding that after receiving reports of child
sex abuse by priests, the religious institution would ignore communications from the victims,
conduct an “internal investigation . . . [that] was primarily geared to delay, with the hope that the
victim . . . would not persist in pursuing their claim” and “consistently shuttle[] the abuser from
place to place each time an allegation came to light . . . without notifying anyone locally, including
the other clergy at the new assignment, of the transferee’s prior troubling history . . . put[ting]
more children at risk”).
54. For a detailed description of these efforts, see infra Parts I.B–E, 2.C–D.
55. 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 2.
56. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
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churches accountable. These statutes included obstruction of justice,57
contributing to the delinquency of a minor,58 mandatory reporting of
suspicions of child sex abuse,59 and child endangerment.60 Other
jurisdictions concluded that no statute could hold supervisory priests
accountable either because the relevant statutes of limitations had
expired or because the conduct did not meet statutory requirements.61
B. Failure to Charge Due to Statutes of Limitations or Other Legal
Inadequacies
In many cases, supervisory priests avoided criminal prosecution
because of the extended delays in victims reporting abuse62 and the
relatively short statutes of limitations for the offenses with which the
supervisory priests were most likely to be charged.63 Delayed reporting

57. E.g., Alan Cooperman, Bishop Avoids Charges: Phoenix Prelate Gives Up Power in
Sex Abuse Cases, WASH. POST (June 3, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/pb/archive/
politics/2003/06/03/bishop-avoids-charges/f77a4dab-ee8c-4c0d-9a53-ebd882f6efb4 [http://perma.
cc/4MHA-JWN2] (discussing the investigating attorney’s threats of prosecuting under felony
obstruction-of-justice charges under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2409 (2016)).
58. E.g., 2015 Minnesota Complaint, supra note 37, at 1–2 (charging under MINN. STAT.
§ 260B.425.1(a) (1999)).
59. E.g., 2011 Missouri Indictment, supra note 38, at 1 (charging under MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.115 (West 2014)); Jim Doyle, Santa Rosa/Bishop Avoids Charge in Failure to Swiftly Report
Abuse Claims/Counseling Instead of Misdemeanor for Delay in Notification, SFGATE (Nov. 21,
2006, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SANTA-ROSA-Bishop-avoids-chargein-failure-to-2466423.php [https://perma.cc/5K8P-AAB4]; Goodstein, supra note 39.
60. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 798 (Pa. 2015) (charging under 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 4304(a) (1995)); 2002 New Hampshire Agreement, supra note 36, at 2 (charging under
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (LexisNexis 2016)); 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at
114 (charging under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304(a) (1995)).
61. E.g., 2004 MAINE AG REPORT, supra note 53, at 2; OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON: A REPORT BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 2 (2003) [hereinafter 2003
MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT]; 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT supra note 43, at 154; 2016
PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 146; 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note
14, at 69–70; 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 15–16; SUFFOLK CTY. SUPREME
COURT SPECIAL GRAND JURY, GRAND JURY REPORT, at 175 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SUFFOLK
NY GJ REPORT]; 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 13.
62. In 2002, a study found that although 80.5 percent of the reported incidents of abuse “had
taken place by 1985 . . . only 810 incidents had been reported to dioceses by that time.” 2011 JOHN
JAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 9. See 2004 MAINE AG REPORT, supra note 53, at 6 (“Most of the
complaint were not brought to the Diocese’s attention (or the attention of authorities) until many
years after the alleged conduct.”).
63. Virtually all grand jury reports related to charges for supervisory priests cited an expired
statute of limitations as a reason for failing to bring at least some charges and recommended
increasing or removing the statute of limitations. For examples of these reports, see supra note 61
and accompanying text.
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of abuse is common, as “many victims need decades to come forward
. . . often [because] it is not until years after the sexual abuse that
victims experience negative outcomes.”64 Many negative effects of
child sexual abuse do not surface until adulthood, “includ[ing] ‘sexual
problems, dysfunctions or compulsions, confusion and struggles over
gender and sexual identity, homophobia . . . problems with intimacy,
shame, guilt and self-blame, low self-esteem and negative self-images,
and anger.’”65 Most statutes of limitations for child sex abuse crimes
still fail to account for the typical reporting delay, allowing many child
sex abusers to escape prosecution.66 Even if a prosecutor attempted to
charge a supervisory priest in 2002 just after receiving a delayed report
of child sex abuse, the statute of limitations for misdemeanors or
nonmajor felonies would likely have long expired.67 To address this
discrepancy, nearly all of the grand jury or attorneys general reports
that investigated supervisory priest conduct recommended that state
legislatures extend the statutes of limitations for certain claims—
including for crimes “where the victim of a sex offense is a minor”68—
64. Marci A. Hamilton, Child Sex Abuse in Institutional Settings: What Is Next, 89 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 421, 429 (2012); see also 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at
3 (explaining that “children who are sexually abused often experience memory suppression,”
sometimes causing reporting delays of “[t]wenty to thirty years”); cf. Laura Russell, Note,
Pursuing Criminal Liability for the Church and Its Decision Makers for their Role in Priest Sexual
Abuse, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 885, 914 (2003) (recognizing how the delayed reporting of child sex
abuse and insufficiently long statutes of limitations preclude criminal liability for supervisory and
abusive priests). For statistics on victims’ delayed reporting of child sex abuse by priests, see supra
notes 46–48, 61–63 and accompanying text.
65. Hamilton, supra note 64, at 429 (quoting David Lisak, The Psychological Impact of
Sexual Abuse: Content Analysis of Interviews with Male Survivors, 7 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 525,
526 (1994)).
66. See id. at 431–33 (describing how victims of sexual abuse are thwarted by the short
statutes of limitations for criminal and civil laws that could be used to hold their attackers
accountable). For examples of statutes of limitations for some state child-endangerment statutes,
see infra note 67.
67. New Hampshire’s statute of limitations for endangering the welfare of a child, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (LexisNexis 2015), a misdemeanor, is one year after the conduct. Id. § 625:8.
New York’s child-endangerment statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 2015), also a
misdemeanor, has a statute of limitations of two years, id. § 30.10(2)(c). Pennsylvania’s childendangerment statute, 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (West 2015), a misdemeanor
or felony based on the course of conduct, has the longest statute of limitations and, until 2007,
tolled the statute of limitations until the minor’s eighteenth birthday and then added two years.
41 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552(c)(3) (West 2006). Even the longest statute of
limitations for child endangerment would have expired by 2000 for a five-year-old child abused
in 1985, considering the minor would have turned eighteen in 1998 and adding two years, per the
Pennsylvania statute of limitations.
68. 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 1; see also 2003 PHILADELPHIA
GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 15–17 (recommending that the statute of limitations be extended);
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or amend child-endangerment69 or mandatory-reporting statutes70 to
ensure that supervisory priests’ conduct is within the scope of liability.
In the first attempt to criminally charge supervisory priests, a
grand jury from Westchester County concluded:
[I]n the face of overwhelming evidence of sexual abuse and
misconduct . . . the religious institution never reported such
allegations to law enforcement authorities. . . . The Grand Jury infers
that this was an orchestrated effort to protect abusing clergy members
from investigation, arrest and prosecution . . . [and] the religious
institution from adverse publicity.71

Despite these excoriating findings, the grand jury was unable to charge
any supervisory priest. The grand jury recommended that the
legislature include clergy among mandatory reporters of child sex
abuse and criminalize “the reckless supervision by employers of
employees known to have harmed children.”72 In recognizing that a
major impediment to prosecution was the victims’ prolonged delay in
reporting abuse, the grand jury “urge[d] the Legislature to amend the
. . . [l]aw to eliminate the Statute of Limitations where the victim of a
sex offense is a minor.”73
One year later, a Suffolk County, New York, grand jury released
a 181-page report regarding alleged child sexual abuse by the Diocese
of Rockville Centre that came to similar conclusions.74 The grand jury
likewise found that the diocese “ignored credible complaints [and]
failed to act on obvious warning signs of sexual abuse . . . [e]ven where

2003 SUFFOLK NY GJ REPORT, supra note 61, at 175–76 (same); 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ
REPORT, supra note 14, at 69–70 (same); 2016 PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 146
(same).
69. 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 17; 2003 SUFFOLK NY GJ REPORT,
supra note 61, at 177; 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 72–73.
70. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 73–74; 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ
REPORT, supra note 10, at 17; 2003 SUFFOLK NY GJ REPORT, supra note 61, at 178; 2002
WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 1; see also OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION
3 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 MASSACHUSETTS AG EXEC. REPORT] (noting that Massachusetts’s
“child abuse reporting law [was] not applicable because it was not expanded to include priests
until 2002”).
71. 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 7.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id. at 6.
74. 2003 SUFFOLK NY GJ REPORT, supra note 61.
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a priest disclosed sexually abusive behavior with children.”75 Although
supervisory priest conduct “warranted criminal prosecution . . . [it is]
precluded because there was no legal responsibility on the part of
priests to report what they knew about child abuse and . . . prosecution
[is] beyond the statute of limitations.”76 Because supervisory priest
conduct did not fall within any New York criminal statute, the grand
jury recommended amending mandatory-reporter statutes to include
religious officials, expanding child-endangerment statutes to include
supervisory priests and religious institutions, and either eliminating the
statute of limitations for crimes against minors or extending it to a
minimum of fifteen years after the minor turns eighteen.77
Later that year, similar impediments led the Massachusetts
attorney general to issue a report resulting in no criminal charges
against the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston or its supervisory
priests. The report found that the archdiocese did not adequately
supervise priests whom it knew sexually abused children, concealed
reports of abuse from law enforcement, and placed children at risk by
transferring abusive priests to other parishes without telling the new
parish about the allegations against the priest.78 Unfortunately, despite
the overwhelming evidence of abuse and cover-up by diocese officials,
Massachusetts could not bring charges because, until 2002,
Massachusetts’s law requiring the mandatory reporting of child abuse
did not include priests,79 and its child endangerment law did not
encompass the conduct of supervisory priests.80 “If these laws had been
in place earlier, . . . [Massachusetts] would have had much more
effective tools at [its] disposal as [it] sought to hold accountable those
responsible for placing children at risk for sexual abuse.”81
In 2004, Maine’s attorney general investigated the Catholic
Diocese of Portland “to determine whether the Diocese, the Bishop or
other administrative personnel had any criminal liability arising from
their supervisory role over the accused priests.”82 Like the other
charging attempts by the Massachusetts attorney general and New
75. Id. at 172.
76. Id. at 174.
77. Id. at 175–78.
78. 2003 MASSACHUSETTS AG EXEC. REPORT, supra note 70, at 3–5.
79. Id. at 3; 2003 MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT, supra note 61, at 22–23.
80. See 2003 MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT, supra note 61, at 24 (describing a law passed by
the Massachusetts legislature in 2002 that created the crime of recklessly endangering children).
81. Id.
82. 2004 MAINE AG REPORT, supra note 53, at 2.
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York grand juries, the Maine attorney general concluded that “no
prosecutable cases [fell] within the statute of limitations”83 and that
there was “no criminal liability on the part of the Bishop, the Diocese
or its administrative staff” under the current statutes as written.84
In 2003, 2005, and 2016, grand juries in Pennsylvania concluded
that the applicable statutes of limitations prevented the prosecution of
supervisory priests, or that the relevant statutes did not legally
encompass the conduct of supervisory priests. A 2003 Philadelphia
grand jury recognized that “the statute of limitations currently in effect
may preclude the prosecution of . . . those individuals who covered up
the crimes and/or allowed them to occur”85 and that current
Pennsylvania statutes were not legally sufficient to prosecute
supervisory priests.86 In 2005, a Philadelphia grand jury concluded that
“while the actions of the Archdiocese leaders clearly facilitated rapes
and other sexual offenses [by priests] and ensured that more would
occur,” “legal definitions and statute of limitations problems . . .
prevent prosecution.”87 Finally, in 2016, a grand jury found that certain
supervisory priests in the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown “failed to
protect children entrusted to their care and guidance” by “plac[ing]
their desire to avoid public scandal over the wellbeing of innocent
children” and “return[ing the abusive priests] to ministry with full
knowledge they were child predators.”88 The grand jury then
recognized that supervisory priests could not be prosecuted because
the statutes of limitations for many of the relevant criminal statutes had
expired.89 To resolve these issues, the grand juries called for extending
or eliminating statutes of limitations for sexual offenses against
minors90 and amending or enacting statutes to criminalize the conduct
of supervisory priests.91

83. Id. at 2.
84. Id. at 3.
85. 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 15.
86. See id. at 17 (calling for the enactment of a statute that criminalizes recklessly engaging
in conduct that creates a substantial risk of harm to a child and for the clarification of the
mandatory-reporter law as applied to clergy).
87. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 64–69 (analyzing various ways that
archdiocesan officials could be prosecuted and finding them all legally insufficient).
88. 2016 PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 6.
89. Id. at 146.
90. 2016 PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 146; 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ
REPORT, supra note 14, at 69–72; 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 16–17.
91. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 72–74; 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ
REPORT, supra note 10, at 17.
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C. Obstruction of Justice
Statutes that prohibit obstructing justice help protect the integrity
of legal proceedings and the justice system by targeting “a broad range
of behavior that impedes or defeats the operation of government.”92 In
upholding a statute that criminalized obstructing justice, the Supreme
Court recognized the “legitimate interest [of states] in protecting
[their] judicial system[s],” and “the utmost importance that the
administration of justice be absolutely fair and orderly.”93 Specific
formulations of what qualifies as obstruction vary from state to state,
but, generally, individuals who knowingly obstruct, delay, or prevent
government operations, criminal investigations, or the communication
of information related to a criminal violation to government officials,
violate the statute.94 The mere act of doing something that might
eventually obstruct justice, such as destroying an incriminating
document, typically does not qualify as obstructing justice unless there
is some nexus between the destruction of the document and knowledge
of an investigation or official proceeding.95 Because the actions of
supervisory priests in covering up allegations of child sexual abuse
precluded the government from investigating and potentially charging
the abusive priests, some jurisdictions tried to charge supervisory
priests with obstruction of justice.
In one case, a bishop of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Phoenix, Arizona, entered into a legal agreement with the Maricopa
County district attorney, admitting to “conceal[ing] sexual abuse of
children by priests” in lieu of being prosecuted for obstruction of
justice.96 The district attorney considered charging Bishop Thomas J.
O’Brien with obstruction of justice for “instruct[ing] a priest . . . to
persuade a Catholic family not to report an incident of sexual
molestation to the police” and for firing the priest when he refused.97
Instead of charging O’Brien, the district attorney entered into a
comprehensive agreement with the archdiocese to stop the abuse and
implement adequate controls to prevent future child sex abuse.98 The
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.1 Introductory Note for Sections 242.1–242.8 (AM. LAW
INST. 2001).
93. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965).
94. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2402 (2016); id. § 13-2409.
95. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 709 (2005); United States v.
Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995).
96. Cooperman, supra note 57.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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district attorney successfully extracted admissions from O’Brien about
his complicity in enabling priests to sexually abuse children by failing
to take action to stop them.99 As part of the agreement, O’Brien
“acknowledge[d] that he allowed . . . priests under his supervision to
have contact with minors after becoming aware of allegations of
criminal sexual misconduct . . . [and that he] transferr[ed] offending
priests to situations where children could be further victimized.”100 The
district attorney also secured for the church a new sexual-misconduct
policy, victim-advocate positions, a training program on the
mandatory-reporting law, and a $300,000 fund to support the
counseling of those victimized by the church’s priests.101
The Maricopa County district attorney should be commended for
securing admissions from a supervisory priest and for requiring the
archdiocese to pay restitution and implement safeguards against future
abuse. Using the threat of an obstruction-of-justice charge against
O’Brien was effective in securing a measure of justice. But the conduct
meant to be covered by obstruction statutes pales in comparison to the
conduct in which O’Brien and other supervisory priests engaged.
Obstruction statutes can be violated by simply destroying an
incriminating document or trying to persuade a witness not to testify.102
Statutes that criminalize such conduct seem deficient in addressing the
conduct of supervisory priests, who endangered the welfare of children
by knowingly putting them in positions where they were likely to be
abused by historically abusive priests and actively concealing that
abuse.103 Supervisory priests’ conduct by itself, no matter how
reprehensible, would not even constitute obstruction of justice unless
the conduct was in some way connected to a government investigation
or proceeding.104 Although O’Brien may have in fact been guilty of
obstruction of justice, to threaten prosecution under that statute seems,
as a normative matter, woefully inadequate to address the seriousness
99. May 3, 2003 Agreement between State of Arizona, ex rel. Richard M. Romley, Maricopa
County Attorney, Thomas J. O’Brien, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix, and
the Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix (Ariz. 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/
bishopagreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DSH-D6WX].
100. Id. at 3.
101. Id.
102. For further discussion on what constitutes obstruction of justice and the purpose of that
type of statute, see supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
103. For further discussion of supervisory priests’ role in perpetuating child sex abuse by
lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 43, 52–53 and accompanying text.
104. For further discussion on what qualifies as obstruction of justice, see supra note 95 and
accompanying text.
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of O’Brien’s depraved conduct. Even if a degree of justice was
achieved through the prosecutor’s threatened obstruction charge, the
tangential relation of the charge to O’Brien’s true crimes leaves a wide
gap between the culpability associated with obstruction of justice and
O’Brien’s misconduct.
D. Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
Prosecutors have also attempted to hold supervisory priests liable
for concealing child sex abuse through “contributing to the
delinquency of a minor” statutes. By the 1960s, most states had a
statute that criminalized conduct that “corrupt[s] the morals”105 or
“‘contributes’ to the ‘delinquency, dependency, or neglect’ of a
child.”106 The purpose of these statutes was “to punish an adult for
subjecting a child to influences requiring judicial intervention on the
child’s behalf.”107 Delinquency statutes are expansive, criminalizing
“[a] range of behavior . . . as broad as the whole penal code and
more.”108 Some examples of conduct punishable under a delinquency
statute include encouraging a child to refuse to salute the American
flag,109 allowing a minor “to be present in a place where [intoxicating]
beverages were sold,”110 and taking a teenage girl for a ride in a car
“against her father’s orders . . . even though the girl asked for the
ride.”111 Despite the breadth of conduct covered by delinquency
statutes, most states uniformly “treated . . . [all conduct that results in]
contributing to the delinquency of a minor . . . as a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment of one year or less.”112 Delinquency
statutes therefore assign the same misdemeanor-grade punishment to
“such disparate behavior as raping a child, buying stolen goods from a
juvenile, serving alcohol to a teenager, and encouraging an adolescent
to evade the control of his parents.”113 Although most of the cases
under the delinquency statute “had some sexual connotation,”114

105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 cmt. 1 at 444 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
106. Id. at 445.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 446.
109. Id. (citing State v. Davis, 120 P.2d 808 (Ariz. 1942)).
110. Id. (citing State v. Sobelman, 271 N.W. 484 (Minn. 1937)).
111. Id. at 448 (citing State v. Harris, 141 S.E. 637 (W. Va. 1928)).
112. Id. at 449.
113. Id. at 450.
114. Id. at 447.
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delinquency statutes “contravene the general precept that criminal
laws should state their proscriptions with fair specificity and
precision.”115 The broad range of conduct covered by delinquency
statutes made them a candidate for use in prosecutions of supervisory
priests and churches.
In June 2015, the district attorney of Ramsey County, Minnesota,
issued a forty-four page indictment of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul
and Minneapolis, charging it with “Contribut[ing] to Need for
Protection or Services” and “Contributing to Status as Juvenile Petty
Offender or Delinquency.”116 The indictment recounted the
archdiocese’s awareness of priest Curtis Wehmeyer’s long history of
child sexual abuse and lascivious conduct.117 Wehmeyer had an
extensive record of child sex abuse: he sexually assaulted two boys in
2010 and pleaded guilty in November 2012 to sexual assault and
possession of child pornography.118 The indictment alleged that the
archdiocese had policies “to prevent harm to children . . . [which] were
not followed”119 and that the archdiocese’s practice of covering up
priest sex abuse was “not isolated or unique.”120 After over a year of
settlement negotiations, the district attorney agreed to drop the
charges against the archdiocese “in exchange for its admission that it
failed to protect three children from sexual abuse.”121
Just as the Maricopa County district attorney gained concessions
through his threatened prosecution of the Phoenix archdiocese under
the obstruction statute, the Ramsey County district attorney should be
commended for using Minnesota’s delinquency statute to extract
admissions from the Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis. But
the widely disparate conduct captured by the delinquency statute
diminishes the perceived egregiousness of the supervisory priests’
conduct. The indictment details repeated instances in which
115. Id. at 449.
116. 2015 Minnesota Complaint, supra note 37, at 1.
117. Id. at 4–29.
118. Melanie Sommer, Defrocked Priest Curtis Wehmeyer Pleads Guilty, Is Sentenced in a 3rd
Sexual Abuse Case, BRING ME THE NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015), http://bringmethenews.com/2015/
08/18/defrocked-priest-curtis-wehmeyer-pleads-guilty-is-sentenced-in-a-third-sexual-abuse-case
[http://perma.cc/NP4J-N9TM].
119. 2015 Minnesota Complaint, supra note 37, at 25.
120. Id. at 29.
121. Laurie Goodstein & Richard Pérez-Peña, Minnesota Priest’s Memo Says Vatican
Ambassador Tried to Stifle Sex Abuse Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/us/minnesota-priests-memo-says-vatican-envoy-tried-to-stifle-sexabuse-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/2LAE-K2BU].
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supervisory priests were made aware of Wehmeyer’s child sex abuse,
chose to conceal the reports, promoted Wehmeyer, and placed him in
a training program the supervisory priests knew was ineffective,
leaving more children vulnerable to a known sexual predator.122
Prosecuting the supervisory priests’ misconduct under the same type of
statute that also criminalizes encouraging a minor to refuse to salute
the American flag123—both of which could be punished as
misdemeanors carrying a maximum sentence of one year of
imprisonment and a modest fine124—adds insult to the injuries of
Wehmeyer’s many victims and fails to capture the moral desert of the
supervisory priests. Thus, although the threat of a delinquency charge
was effective in obtaining admissions of guilt, the moral
blameworthiness associated with the delinquency statute does not
approach the egregiousness of supervisory priests’ conduct and the
harm they inflicted on innocent children.
E. Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse
Statutes that require clergy to report suspicions of child abuse
seem like an obvious tool for prosecutors to use against supervisory
priests. As of November 2013, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia had statutes identifying persons who are required to report
suspected child abuse to authorities, and forty-eight states had statutes
that designate certain professions whose members must report.125
States began passing mandatory-reporting laws based on model
language proposed by the Children’s Bureau126 in 1963 as a reaction to
a prominent study on the pervasiveness of child abuse.127 By the time

122. 2015 Minnesota Complaint, supra note 37, at 4–29.
123. For examples of other conduct criminalized by delinquency statutes, see supra notes 109–
11 and accompanying text.
124. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1008 (1939) (stating that the maximum sentence for
contributing to the delinquency of a minor is one year of imprisonment or a $350 fine, or both);
2015 Minnesota Complaint, supra note 37, at 1 (stating that the maximum sentence for a violation
of the delinquency statute is “1 year or $3,000 fine, or both”). The definitions of the relevant
gradations of crimes are found in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02 (2015).
125. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN
& FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MANDATORY REPORTERS OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (2015), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EE3E-FK3T] [hereinafter CHILDREN’S BUREAU MANDATORY REPORTERS].
126. Robert E. Shepard, Jr., The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182,
190 (1965).
127. Leonard G. Brown, III & Kevin Gallagher, Mandatory Reporting of Abuse: A Historical
Perspective on the Evolution of States’ Current Mandatory Reporting Laws with a Review of the
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the federal government passed the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (CAPTA)128 in 1974, which conditioned federal grants
on the enactment of mandatory-reporting laws, every state had a
mandatory-reporting law.129 The purpose of these laws was “to
facilitate the discovery of instances of suspected child abuse by
requiring . . . physicians and others to report their suspicions [of abuse]
. . . [with the] hope[] th[at] steps taken subsequent to the report
diminish the prospect of further injury to the child.”130 These laws
initially targeted physicians because of their role in monitoring health
and the physical nature of child abuse,131 and the laws typically
“cloth[ed] the physician with a statutory immunity from [civil and
criminal] liability” arising from a good-faith report of abuse.132
A mandatory reporter who fails to report child abuse is guilty of a
misdemeanor in most states, with just four states classifying the
conduct as a felony under certain circumstances.133 Twenty-seven states
include clergy as professionals who are required to report known or
suspected instances of child abuse or neglect.134 As a result of the
limited number of states that include clergy among mandatory
reporters, only some states that considered charges against the Church
or supervisory priests were able to prosecute them under mandatoryreporting statutes.135
In one case from November 2003, the Archdiocese of Cincinnati
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for “failing to report sexually abusive

Laws in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 37, 37 (2013). The
prominent study on the pervasiveness of child abuse is titled “The Battered-Child Syndrome.” Id.
128. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5116 (2012)).
129. Brown & Gallagher, supra note 130, at 38.
130. Monrad G. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1967); see also Victor I. Vieth, Passover in Minnesota: Mandated Reporting
and the Unequal Protection of Abused Children, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 131, 155 (1998)
(noting that “it is logical to require [teachers] to report [child] abuse” because they “are in regular
contact with children”).
131. Paulsen, supra note 130, at 3–4.
132. Id. at 31.
133. Brown & Gallagher, supra note 127, at 63.
134. CHILDREN’S BUREAU MANDATORY REPORTERS, supra note 125, at 2.
135. See 2003 MASSACHUSETTS AG EXEC. REPORT, supra note 70, at 3 (finding that clergy
were not listed as reporters until 2002, too late to cover the conduct). But see 2004 MAINE AG
REPORT, supra note 53, at 9, 11 (declining to prosecute the Archdiocese for failing to report in
part because the Archdiocese consistently reported suspected instances of child abuse after clergy
were added to the list of mandatory reporters in 1997).
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priests in the 1970s and 80s.”136 The guilty plea came just before
prosecutors went to the grand jury to indict the archdiocese.137 The
archdiocese paid the maximum fine of $10,000 and agreed to set up a
“$3 million fund to compensate sexual abuse victims who cannot sue
the church because their cases are beyond the statute of limitations.”138
In another instance, Bishop Robert Finn of the Diocese of Kansas
City-St. Joseph, Missouri, was convicted of failing to report suspected
child abuse in September 2012.139 Finn failed to report Father Shawn
Ratigan for taking “pornographic pictures of young girls” for five
months from 2010 through early 2011.140 Finn also knew of Ratigan’s
previous “inappropriate behavior with children” and his possession of
child pornography but continued to employ him and give him access to
children to abuse.141 Finn was convicted for failing in his duty as a
mandatory reporter, a misdemeanor, and the judge dropped two
charges against the diocese.142 Finn was sentenced to two years of
court-supervised probation, and was required to set up a $10,000 fund
for victim counseling and “start a [mandatory-reporter] training
program for diocesan employees in detecting early signs of child abuse,
and in what constitutes child pornography and obscenity.”143
Though he failed to obtain a conviction under a mandatoryreporter statute, Sonoma County District Attorney Stephan
Passalacqua used the threat of prosecution under such a statute to
obtain an admission of guilt and mandatory counseling for a
supervisory priest.144 On April 27, 2006, Reverend Francisco OchoaPerez, as assistant pastor, confessed to Bishop Daniel Walsh of the
Santa Rosa Catholic Diocese that he had sexually abused children

136. Goodstein, supra note 39.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Bill Draper, Events of the Child-Porn Case that Brought Down a U.S. Bishop, CRUX
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.cruxnow.com/church/2015/04/22/events-of-the-child-porn-case-thatbrought-down-a-us-bishop [http://perma.cc/YN5W-3FNZ].
140. John Eligon & Laurie Goodstein, Kansas City Bishop Convicted of Shielding Pedophile
Priest, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/kansas-city-bishopconvicted-of-shielding-pedophile-priest.html [http://perma.cc/7SAG-Z2ZC].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Doyle, supra note 59; Guy Konver, Reaction: Catholics Praise Deal; Victim Advocates
Angry, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Nov. 21, 2006), http://www.pressdemocrat.com/news/2116569-181/
reaction-catholics-praise-deal-victim [https://perma.cc/K7UN-XHQF].
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three different times.145 Instead of immediately telling the authorities,
as was required by California’s mandatory-reporting law,146 Walsh first
consulted with the diocese’s attorney.147 Walsh waited three days
before telling Sonoma County’s Child Protective Services about
Ochoa-Perez’s admissions of child sex abuse.148 During the three-day
delay, Ochoa-Perez escaped to Mexico.149 Walsh’s failure to
immediately report Ochoa-Perez was likely a violation of California’s
mandatory-reporting law; however, because Walsh had no prior
criminal record and admitted wrongdoing, the district attorney offered
Walsh a four-month counseling program instead of filing misdemeanor
charges, which Walsh accepted.150
The Kansas City and Cincinnati convictions were watershed
moments in holding the Church and supervisory priests accountable
because the mandatory-reporter statutes were enforced consistently
with their purpose: punishing those who breached their duty to protect
children suspected of being abused from further harm.151 Mandatoryreporter statutes can successfully target clergy as required reporters of
child abuse, but the statutes fail to adequately encapsulate the
egregiousness of the supervisory priests’ conduct. Supervisory priests
did much more than merely fail to report suspected child abuse.
Supervisory priests knowingly concealed child sex abuse by priests over
whom they had authority, and sometimes transferred the offending
priests to new congregations without making the new congregations
aware of the child-abuse allegations against the priests.152 By not acting
to protect children, supervisory priests enabled the offending priests to
continue sexually abusing children.
The situation at issue here also differs from the prototypical
situation in which mandatory-reporting statutes were meant to apply.
The original purpose of mandatory-reporting statutes was to require
physicians and other professionals who may observe physical injuries
145. Doyle, supra note 59.
146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 2006) (requiring the mandated reporter to “make an
initial report . . . immediately . . . and send . . . a written followup report within 36 hours of
receiving the information concerning the incident”).
147. Doyle, supra note 59.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. For further discussion on the original purpose of mandatory-reporter laws, see supra
notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
152. For further discussion of supervisory priests’ role in perpetuating child sex abuse by
lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 43, 52–53 and accompanying text.
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in the course of their work with children to report suspected child
abuse to the relevant authorities.153 Supervisory priests are unlike
typical mandatory reporters because they have authority over the
perpetrators of the abuse and, by failing to use that authority to protect
children from the abusers, facilitate further child sex abuse. With
supervisory priests, there is often a repeated failure to act on reliable
reports of offending priests’ sexual abuse. The failure to report the
offending priest is the most basic crime of which supervisory priests are
guilty. But supervisory priests’ conduct is more egregious, enabling
individuals under their authority to sexually abuse children by failing
to remove the abusive priest even after receiving credible allegations
of abuse. Therefore, although mandatory-reporter statutes are legally
sufficient to cover the conduct of supervisory priests, those statutes,
like delinquency and obstruction-of-justice statutes, do not adequately
capture the culpability of supervisory priests.
II. CHILD ENDANGERMENT: MORALLY SUFFICIENT YET LEGALLY
INADEQUATE
The final way prosecutors have attempted to hold supervisory
priests accountable is through child-endangerment statutes. Child
endangerment is an apt description of supervisory priests’ conduct, but
child-endangerment statutes are not legally sufficient to cover the
conduct of supervisory priests because supervisory priests 1) are not a
class of individuals targeted by the statute, and therefore do not have
a duty to the abused children, and 2) do not engage in the direct
supervision of children. Although “an argument could be made that
the individual priests had a duty of care for the children they assaulted,
it is impossible to transfer this duty to [supervisory priests].”154 In
addition, “it is even more difficult to show that [supervisory priests]
were responsible for ‘supervising the welfare’ of all the children

153. For further discussion of supervisory priests’ role in perpetuating child sex abuse by
lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
154. Jesse Belcher-Timme, Unholy Acts: The Clergy Sex Scandal in Massachusetts and the
Legislative Response, 30 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243, 264 (2004) (referring
specifically to child-endangerment statutes based on the MPC). But cf. Martinelli v. Bridgeport
Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that it was reasonable
for a jury to conclude that a diocese owed a fiduciary duty to a minor parishioner who was sexually
abused by a priest when the diocese received detailed allegations of abuse and failed to investigate
them or warn other parishioners).
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alleging abuse.”155 Nevertheless, despite these legal inadequacies,
several jurisdictions have attempted to prosecute supervisory priests or
churches under child-endangerment statutes.
A. Legal Elements of the MPC’s Child-Endangerment Statute
The modern child-endangerment statute used in many states is
based on MPC § 230.4,156 which criminalizes endangering the welfare
of a child.157 That statute reads, “A parent, guardian, or other person
supervising the welfare of a child under 18 commits a misdemeanor if
he knowingly endangers the child’s welfare by violating a duty of care,
protection, or support.”158 The scope of individuals covered under the
statute is limited to parents, guardians, or others in similar roles.159
Because the statute imposes a duty on a certain class of
individuals, a breach of that duty can occur by the duty-bearers’ acts or
omissions. The statute was meant to apply only “to those legal duties
arising by reason of the actor’s status as a ‘parent, guardian, or other
person supervising the welfare of the child.’”160 The legal duty “may
arise from contractual obligation, from settled principles of tort or
family law, or from other legal sources.”161 The MPC commentary
explicitly distinguishes the legal duty from a duty “owed by all citizens
to one another or . . . which a stranger may owe to a minor.”162 The
commentary also states that “the actor must know of the facts giving
rise to the duty of care, protection, or support, though . . . [not that] the
law . . . imposes the legal duty.”163

155. Belcher-Timme, supra note 154, at 264–65; see also 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT,
supra note 14, at 65 (justifying a grand jury’s decision not to charge supervisory priests with child
endangerment because “[h]igh-level Archdiocese officials . . . were far removed from any direct
contact with children” (emphasis added)).
156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 cmt. 4 at 452 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
157. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4; see also 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (West
2006) (using similar wording as § 230.4); 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT supra note 43, at 3
(noting that New Hampshire’s statute was adapted from § 230.4).
158. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4.
159. Id.
160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 cmt. 2 at 450 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
161. Id. § 230.4 cmt. 3 at 450–51.
162. Id. § 230.4 cmt. 3 at 451.
163. Id. § 230.4 cmt. 3 at 452.
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B. Child-Endangerment Statutes Reflect the Moral Culpability of
Supervisory Priests’ Conduct
As the Philadelphia grand jury pointed out in its 2005 report, “In
the common sense of the term, the actions of the church hierarchy
clearly constituted endangerment of the welfare of children.”164 In the
case of supervisory priests, endangering the welfare of children is the
most appropriate description of their wrongful conduct. After
becoming aware of abuse by certain priests, supervisory priests
routinely ignored or concealed the offending priests’ conduct at the
expense of children’s physical and emotional welfare.165 These
supervisory priests actively chose to endanger the welfare of minors—
one of the most vulnerable populations that the law seeks to
protect166—by knowingly allowing them to be in the care of priests who
had a record of child sex abuse.167 Supervisory priests also endangered
the welfare of children by transferring priests to other parishes without
notifying the parish of why the priest was being transferred or his
history of sexual abuse, endangering more unwitting children.168 The
harm that statutes seek to prevent is often not a perfect match with the
conduct in particular cases; however, the harm sought to be prevented
by child-endangerment statutes comes closest to the harm inflicted on
sexually abused children by supervisory priests. This match between
supervisory priests’ conduct and child endangerment led prosecutors
in two states to use child-endangerment statutes based on the MPC to
hold supervisory priests accountable.
C. Child-Endangerment Plea: 2002 Diocese of Manchester, New
Hampshire
1. Relevant Conduct and the New Hampshire Child-Endangerment
Statute. A report released by the New Hampshire attorney general
164. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 65.
165. For further discussion and examples of supervisory priests’ role in perpetuating child sex
abuse by lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 43, 50–53, 75, 78, 100 and accompanying text.
166. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (describing children as having peculiar
vulnerabilities and noting that states can adjust legal systems to protect them); see also 2016
PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 147 (“There is no member of the public in greater
need of protection than our children.”).
167. For further discussion and examples of supervisory priests’ role in perpetuating child sex
abuse by lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 43, 50–53, 75, 78, 100 and accompanying text.
168. For further discussion of how supervisory priests transferred known abusive priests to
other parishes without disclosing prior abuse allegations against those priests, see supra notes 9,
52–53, 100 and accompanying text.
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detailed the conduct of eight priests at the Diocese of Manchester who
sexually abused children and the diocese’s failure to remove those
priests after repeated reports of abuse.169 Beyond just knowing about
the child sex abuse and failing to terminate or report the offending
priests, the diocese transferred the priests to other congregations
without any limitations, leading to sexual assaults of more children.170
New Hampshire’s child-endangerment statute is modeled on the
MPC child-endangerment statute.171 In relevant part, it reads, “A
person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child . . . if he knowingly
endangers the welfare of a child under 18 years of age . . . by purposely
violating a duty of care, protection or support he owes to such child.”172
Based on the breadth of individuals covered by New Hampshire’s
child-endangerment statute,173 which just mentions “a person” and not
parents or guardians, the attorney general determined that “the
Diocese owe[d] a duty of care to its minor parishioners.”174
Accordingly, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester signed a
nonprosecution agreement with the New Hampshire attorney general
in December 2002.175 As part of the nonprosecution agreement, the
diocese acknowledged that the state likely could have convicted the
diocese of child endangerment had the case gone to trial.176
Additionally, the attorney general found that “the Diocese knew that
a particular priest was sexually assaulting minors, . . . took inadequate
or no action to protect these children within the parish, and . . . the
priest subsequently committed additional acts of sexual abuse against
children that the priest had contact with through the church.”177 Lastly,
the agreement called for the Diocese to ensure “that no person who is
known to have abused a child will either continue or ever be placed in

169. 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra note 43.
170. See id. at 71, 112.
171. Id. at 3. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3, I (LexisNexis 2015) (“A person is guilty
of endangering the welfare of a child . . . if he knowingly endangers the welfare of a child under
18 years of age . . . by purposely violating a duty of care, protection or support he owes to such
child . . . .”), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980) (“A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under
18 commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly endangers the child’s welfare by violating a duty of
care, protection or support.”).
172. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3, I.
173. 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT supra note 43, at 4.
174. Id. at 5.
175. 2002 New Hampshire Agreement, supra note 36.
176. Id. at 2.
177. 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra note 43, at 1.
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ministry”178 and to train staff and abide by mandatory-reporting
requirements.179
2. Legal Inadequacy of New Hampshire’s Child-Endangerment
Statute for Prosecution of Supervisory Priests. By obtaining an
admission that the New Hampshire attorney general had sufficient
evidence to convict the Diocese of Manchester of child endangerment,
the attorney general avoided adjudicating the matter. If he had gone to
court, he likely would have lost. One difference between the MPC and
New Hampshire child-endangerment statutes is that the New
Hampshire statute does not limit the individuals covered to a “parent,
guardian, or other person having supervisory control over the child,”180
but broadens the statute to cover any “person.”181 The New Hampshire
attorney general issued an investigatory report that detailed the legal
theories underpinning the nonprosecution agreement and based the
likelihood of a successful prosecution on the more expansive language
used in the New Hampshire statute.182 After stating that “whether the
Diocese owed a duty of care to its child parishioners” is the “essential
threshold issue” for the diocese’s culpability, the report argues in favor
of diocesan culpability because, unlike the MPC statute, “New
Hampshire’s statute is not limited to a parent, guardian, or other
person having supervisory control over the child, but includes anyone
who owes the child a duty of care.”183 By this logic, the New Hampshire
statute, unlike the MPC statute, covers individuals like supervisory
priests who do not have a relationship akin to that of a parent or
guardian to the child-victim.
However, a later decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court
concluded that the legislature had no intent to broaden the MPC
version of the child-endangerment statute to include individuals like
supervisory priests. In State v. Yates,184 the court addressed the scope
178. 2002 New Hampshire Agreement, supra note 36, at 3.
179. Id. at 4–6.
180. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980).
181. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3, I (LexisNexis 2015); 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT
supra note 43, at 4. For a comparison of the MPC and New Hampshire statutory language, see
supra note 171.
182. See 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT supra note 43, at 4–6 (using a case that dealt
with the broadening language as the basis for the State’s expectation of proving the diocese owed
a duty).
183. Id. at 4.
184. State v. Yates, 876 A.2d 176 (N.H. 2005).
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of the term “duty of care” as used in the New Hampshire statute—an
issue of first impression.185 Yates was a child-endangerment
prosecution of an eighteen-year-old man who gave alcohol to a
fourteen-year-old girl until she became intoxicated, removed her
clothes, sexually assaulted her,186 and then “abandon[ed] her outside in
below freezing temperatures.”187 Because “duty of care” is not defined
in the statute, the court examined the legislative history, which
indicated that the New Hampshire statute is based on the MPC
version.188 The court found that the change in statutory language did
not reflect an intentional broadening of the statute’s scope.189 First, the
court reasoned that the MPC commentary demonstrates the duty
mentioned in the statute “was intended to refer only to those who have
a parental or supervisory relationship with a child,” and because the
legislature is “not presumed to . . . enact redundant provisions,” the
legislature enacted the statute to include “[a] person” instead of
“parents, guardians, or other persons” merely to avoid redundancy
with the duty part of the statute.190 Next, because the legislature kept
the MPC’s language related to a duty “of ‘care, protection, or
support,’” the court reasoned, consistent with the MPC statute, that the
legislature intended to “limit criminal liability . . . to those who have a
familial, or similar/supervisory relationship with [the] minor.”191
Finally, the court looked to the title of the criminal code chapter in
which the statute is located, titled “Offenses Against the Family,” to
further support its reasoning that the statute was only meant to cover
those “persons having a familial, or similar/supervisory relationship
with the victim.”192
Given the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s subsequent rejection
of the theory on which the Manchester Diocese’s nonprosecution
agreement rested, it is likely that the diocese and its supervisory priests
were not within the scope of the child-endangerment statute. The
defendant in Yates directly supervised and assaulted a child, and the

185. Id. at 184 (“[The defendant] challenges only the application of the term ‘duty of care’ [in
the statute] to the circumstances of this case. The defendant’s challenge presents an issue of first
impression.”).
186. Id. at 178–79.
187. Id. at 187.
188. Id. at 185.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 185–86.
191. Id. at 186.
192. Id.
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court still found that he had no duty to the child. Thus, it is unlikely
that the court would have held that a supervisory priest, who had no
direct contact with minor parishioners, had a duty to them under New
Hampshire’s child-endangerment statute.
D. Child-Endangerment Conviction: 2011 Archdiocese of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
1. Relevant Conduct and the Pennsylvania Child-Endangerment
Statute. The other child-endangerment conviction for a supervisory
priest was the Philadelphia district attorney’s conviction of Msgr.
Lynn.193 Msgr. Lynn, as Secretary of the Clergy, was responsible for
“investigat[ing] any allegations of sexual abuse by priests . . . [and]
mak[ing] sure that no priest with a history of sexual abuse of minors
was recommended for assignments.”194 By failing to act on knowledge
that Reverend Edward V. Avery and other priests were sexually
abusing children, Msgr. Lynn “allow[ed] [Avery and others] to remain
in positions where they could continue to prey on children . . . [and]
recommended . . . that the abusers be transferred to new parishes.”195
Msgr. Lynn was charged and convicted under Pennsylvania’s childendangerment statute, which is based on the MPC’s statute.196
Pennsylvania’s child-endangerment statute states, “A parent,
guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18
years of age . . . commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the
welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or
support.”197 Unlike the nonprosecution agreement with the Diocese of
Manchester, the prosecution of Msgr. Lynn was tried in state court.198
2. Legal Insufficiency of Pennsylvania’s Child-Endangerment
Statute. After a grand jury reversed a prior grand jury’s decision, a jury
convicted Msgr. Lynn, and the Superior Court threw out the conviction

193. For a more detailed description of the case against Msgr. Lynn, see supra notes 11–33
and accompanying text.
194. 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 43.
195. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 43–53 (specifying the priests, including Avery, who
Lynn knew had sexually abused children).
196. For further discussion, see supra notes 13, 25, 31 and accompanying text.
197. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1) (West 2015).
198. For a more detailed description of Msgr. Lynn’s trials in Pennsylvania state court, see
supra notes 25–33 and accompanying text.
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on appeal,199 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated Msgr. Lynn’s
conviction of child endangerment in April 2015.200 The court based its
opinion on the notion that the child-endangerment statute was meant
“to cover a broad range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare
and security of . . . children.”201 Given that purpose and the statute’s
“plain and unambiguous” language,202 the court concluded that
“criminal liability does not turn on whether the offender was
supervising . . . the . . . children” because it would “render meaningless
the precise statutory language encompassing the child’s welfare.”203
The court continued, “[T]he requirement of supervision is not limited
to only . . . direct or actual [supervision] . . . [but] [b]y its plain terms it
encompasses all forms of supervision of a child’s welfare.”204 But
holding Msgr. Lynn liable for child endangerment was an
impermissible expansion of the scope of the statute that is inconsistent
with the MPC commentary, the statute’s legislative history, and
Pennsylvania court precedent.
The first grand jury that sought an indictment against Msgr. Lynn
concluded, consistently with the MPC commentary and Pennsylvania’s
historic interpretation,205 that “the offense of endangering welfare of
children is too narrow to support a successful prosecution of the
decisionmakers who were running the Archdiocese . . . [because they]
were far removed from any direct contact with children.”206 The grand
jury recommended that the legislature broaden the childendangerment statute to include individuals in positions like those of
supervisory priests.207 The Pennsylvania legislature subsequently
amended the child-endangerment statute with the support of the

199. For a more detailed description of these events, see supra notes 14–30 and accompanying
text.
200. For further discussion on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstating Msgr. Lynn’s
conviction, see supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
201. Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 818 (Pa. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mack,
359 A.2d 770, 772 (Pa. 1976)).
202. Id. at 823.
203. Id. at 824.
204. Id.
205. For further discussion on the first Philadelphia grand jury’s findings regarding Msgr.
Lynn, see supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
206. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 65.
207. For a more detailed description of the first Philadelphia grand jury’s recommendations
to the Pennsylvania legislature, see supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
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Philadelphia district attorney.208 In Commonwealth v. Lynn,209
Pennsylvania argued that the legislature’s amendment to the statute
was merely a clarification of the statute’s applicability to supervisory
priests;210 however, “[a] change in the language of a statute ordinarily
indicates a change in legislative intent.”211 Here, the consensus among
the first grand jury, the Pennsylvania legislature, and the previous
Philadelphia district attorney that the pre-amendment childendangerment statute did not apply to supervisory priests provides
strong support for the inapplicability of the pre-amendment statute to
people in Msgr. Lynn’s position.
In addition, holding individuals who never had direct contact with
children liable for child endangerment was unprecedented in
Pennsylvania. The Superior Court noted in Lynn that “neither [the
Superior Court] nor [the] Supreme Court ha[d] ever affirmed a
conviction for [child endangerment] whe[n] the accused was not
actually engaged in the supervision of, or was responsible for
supervising, the endangered child.”212 Individuals have been convicted
under the child-endangerment statute who were not the parent or
guardian of the child,213 but there was not one conviction for child
endangerment when the individual was not engaged in the direct
supervision of a child. That fact—combined with the plain language of
the statute, the MPC commentary, and the initial consensus between
the grand jury, district attorney, and state legislature—makes it likely
that Pennsylvania convicted Msgr. Lynn of violating a statute that had
never been interpreted to apply to his conduct. Accordingly, Msgr.
Lynn likely had no constitutionally required notice that the childendangerment statute covered his reprehensible conduct.214

208. For further discussion of the Pennsylvania legislature’s actions in response to the first
Philadelphia grand jury’s recommendations, see supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
209. Commonwealth v. Lynn, 83 A.3d 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
210. Id. at 448 (“The Commonwealth contends . . . the amendment was merely a clarification
of, rather than a substantial change of, the pre-amended statute’s scope of liability.”).
211. Masland v. Bachman, 374 A.2d 517, 521 (Pa. 1977).
212. Commonwealth v. Lynn, 83 A.3d 434, 450 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
213. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 195 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (finding
defendant liable under a child-endangerment statute when he was not a parent or guardian but
lived in the same home as the child and took care of the child).
214. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (noting that an unconstitutional
“deprivation of the right of fair warning can result . . . from an unforeseeable and retroactive
judicial expansion of . . . statutory language [and interpretation]”).
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III. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR PROSECUTION
Despite the Church’s efforts since 2002 to combat pervasive child
sex abuse by priests,215 there continue to be hundreds of new reports of
such abuse each year.216 States can pursue several methods to ensure
that supervisory priests are held accountable for any role they play in
covering up and facilitating reports of abuse.
A. Extend Statutes of Limitations and Include Clergy as Mandatory
Reporters
First, clergy should be added to the list of mandatory reporters,
and the statutes of limitations for mandatory-reporting statutes and
child-endangerment should be eliminated.217 Because not all states
include clergy among mandatory reporters,218 states could simply
amend those statutes to include clergy so they can prosecute clergy for
failing to report suspicions of child sex abuse committed by other
priests.
Additionally, just as the Pennsylvania legislature recognized when
it extended the statute of limitations for child endangerment in 2006,219
victims of child sex abuse typically fail to report the abuse until long
after it occurred.220 Child sex abusers and individuals who have a duty
to report suspicions of abuse should not escape criminal liability merely
because the psychological harm resulting from abuse hinders reporting
for decades after abuse occurs.221 As of May 2016, thirty-eight states
have removed the criminal statute of limitations for many child sex

215. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (2016) (citing the annual audits of dioceses
and eparchies by the Church for child sex abuse allegations since the implementation of the
Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People in 2002).
216. For more detailed statistics, see supra note 4.
217. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 64, at 431–36 (discussing the effects of statute-oflimitations extensions for child sex abuse and suggesting the addition of mandatory-reporting
requirements for clergy); Russell, supra note 64, at 914–15 (proposing amending mandatoryreporter statutes to include clergy and extending statutes of limitations for child sex abuse crimes
as ways to hold supervisory priests accountable).
218. For further discussion of states’ approach to mandatory reporting, see supra notes 134–
35 and accompanying text.
219. Act of Nov. 29, 2006, No. 179, 2006 Pa. Laws 1581 (codified as amended at 42 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552(c)(3) (West 2007)).
220. For statistics on the prevalence of delayed reporting of child sex abuse by victims and
further discussion on the negative effects of child sex abuse, see supra notes 45–47, 62–64 and
accompanying text.
221. Cf. Russell, supra note 64, at 914 (arguing that “delayed reporting . . . of sexual abuse
should not prevent child molesters from facing prosecution”).
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crimes, and eight states have removed the civil statute of limitations for
child sex abuse.222 Other states have had difficulty making these
changes, as states like New York and Pennsylvania have struggled to
pass legislation expanding the statutes of limitations for all crimes
involving child sex abuse due to “opposition from Roman Catholic
leaders, who say the changes could target them unfairly and could
bankrupt church organizations.”223
As an alternative to eliminating or extending statutes of
limitations for sex crimes against children, some states have passed
“window” statutes, which create brief periods during which victims can
bring claims against child sex abusers when their causes of action have
otherwise expired.224 These statutes have typically succeeded in
encouraging victims of child sex abuse to come forward. For example,
approximately 1150 claims were filed during a one-year window in 2003
in California, and approximately 1175 claims were filed during a twoyear window from 2007–2009 in Delaware.225 The relative success of
reopening statutes of limitations for designated periods demonstrates
that giving child sex abuse victims an opportunity to come forward later
in life, either by extending or eliminating the statute of limitations, will
ensure greater accountability for culpable supervisory priests and
direct abusers of minors.
B. Amend Child-Endangerment Statutes Based on the Model Penal
Code
Second, legislatures can choose to amend child-endangerment
statutes to encompass the conduct of supervisory priests and others
similarly situated. Pennsylvania expanded the scope of its statute in
2006 to include “a person that employs or supervises” a parent,
guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child.226 The
222. MARCI A. HAMILTON, CARDOZO LAW JACOB BURNS INST. FOR ADVANCED LEGAL
STUDIES, SUMMARY OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS REFORM ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 5−7
(2016), http://sol-reform.com/snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF9R-EXB9].
223. Brian Mann, Catholic Church Groups Fight Bills to Revive Old Sex Abuse Cases, NPR
(Aug. 24, 2016, 4:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/24/484995344/catholic-church-groups-fightbills-to-revive-old-sex-abuse-cases [https://perma.cc/KZ57-HHAR].
224. Hamilton, supra note 64, at 433.
225. MARCI A. HAMILTON, CARDOZO LAW JACOB BURNS INST. FOR ADVANCED LEGAL
STUDIES, THE RELATIVE SUCCESS OF SOL WINDOW AND REVIVAL STATUTES STATE-BYSTATE 1−3 (2016), http://sol-reform.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/RelativeSuccess_5_
16_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM3F-T6K2].
226. Act of Nov. 29, 2006, No. 179, 2006 Pa. Laws 1581 (codified as amended at 18 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a) (West 2007)).
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amendment also clarified that “the term ‘person supervising the
welfare of a child’ means a person other than a parent or guardian that
provides care, education, training or control of a child.”227 But it is
unclear whether that amendment now includes the conduct of
supervisory priests because the statute still requires that the individual
violate “a duty of care, protection or support.”228 The determinative
issue in Lynn was whether supervisory priests could be said to be
“supervising” children, not whether the defendant had a duty to
them.229 The 2006 amendment did not say anything about whether
those newly included individuals had a duty of care, protection, or
support for the child.230 It would make sense to read the statute as
implying that the supervisors of those who care for the welfare of a
child have a duty to the child, but without relevant legislative history
or court interpretations of the amended statute, it is unclear whether
supervisors have such a duty. Therefore, in amending childendangerment statutes to include supervisory priests within their
scope, states should explicitly indicate that a duty of care to the minor
is imposed on individuals who supervise employees who directly care
for the minor.
C. Enact Statutes that Prohibit the Reckless Creation of or Failure to
Alleviate a Substantial Risk of Child Sex Abuse
Another way to criminalize future conduct of supervisory priests
is to enact an entirely different statute that criminalizes the reckless
creation of a substantial risk of child sex abuse, and the reckless failure
to alleviate that risk when there is a duty to do so.231 This type of statute
was recommended by the Westchester County grand jury232 and the
2003 Philadelphia grand jury,233 and was enacted by the Massachusetts
legislature in 2002.234 In responding to sexual abuse allegations against
227. Id.
228. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a) (West 2015).
229. For further discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rationale in reinstating Msgr.
Lynn’s conviction, see supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text.
230. 2006 Pa. Laws 1581.
231. Cf. Russell, supra note 64, at 911–14 (analyzing reckless-endangerment and failure-toact statutes as potential avenues of prosecution for supervisory priests and churches, and
proposing amendments to make those statutes apply more directly to them).
232. See 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 13 (recommending that New
York enact a statute that would criminalize “the reckless supervision by employers of employees
known to have harmed children”).
233. 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 17.
234. Belcher-Timme, supra note 154, at 252.
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the Church, the Massachusetts state legislature passed a new statute
that reads:
Whoever wantonly or recklessly engages in conduct that creates a
substantial risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to a child or
wantonly or recklessly fails to take reasonable steps to alleviate such
risk where there is a duty to act shall be punished by imprisonment
. . . for not more than 2 ½ years.
For the purposes of this section, such wanton or reckless behavior
occurs when a person is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that his acts, or omissions where
there is a duty to act, would result in serious bodily injury or sexual
abuse to a child. The risk must be of such nature and degree that
disregard of the risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.235

This statute criminalizes the reckless creation of a substantial risk
of child sex abuse, and the reckless failure to alleviate that risk when
there is a duty to do so. In comparison with child-endangerment
statutes based on the MPC, this statute 1) broadens the type of
individuals covered under the statute by omitting references to parents
or guardians, 2) lowers the mens rea, 3) removes the supervision
requirement, and 4) removes the “care, protection, or support”
qualifiers to the statutory duty.236
First, instead of limiting the scope of the statute to a parent,
guardian, or other person similarly situated,237 the Massachusetts
statute covers anybody who engages in the actions listed in the
statute.238 Similar to what the New Hampshire attorney general
believed about the scope of his state’s child-endangerment statute
before the Yates decision,239 the Massachusetts statute explicitly covers
“whoever,” leaving no mistake about the potential scope of the

235. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13L (West 2015) (emphasis added).
236. Compare id. (covering “[w]hoever wantonly or recklessly engages in conduct that creates
a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to a child”), with MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 230.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (covering “[a] parent,
guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 . . . [who] knowingly
endangers the child’s welfare by violating a duty of care, protection or support”).
237. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4.
238. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 265, § 13L.
239. For further discussion of the New Hampshire attorney general’s basis for the
nonprosecution agreement with the Diocese of Manchester, see supra notes 180–83 and
accompanying text.
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statute.240 The breadth of the “whoever” language in the Massachusetts
statute includes individuals such as supervisory priests or others in
similar positions.
Second, the Massachusetts statute lowers the mens rea
requirement to recklessness from knowledge, as required by the MPC
child-endangerment statute and statutes based on it. The supervisory
priests who have been investigated or prosecuted thus far usually knew
subordinate priests were committing abuse, and requiring knowledge
under this statute would still likely capture their conduct.241
Nevertheless, supervisory priests should be exposed to criminal
liability when they recklessly disregard a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that child sex abuse will occur because “it isn’t hard for the people
at the top – the people with real power, who should have real
responsibility – to close their eyes to danger, enabling them to claim
that they lacked ‘knowledge.’”242 Hopefully, the lower mens rea
requirement under the Massachusetts statute will incentivize
supervisory priests to more actively protect children than if they could
only be held liable for having knowledge of the risk of abuse.
Next, the Massachusetts statute removes any consideration of
whether the person directly or indirectly supervised the abused child
by excluding any mention of supervision from the statute.243 The statute
does not limit liability to those who supervise children, or to those who
supervise those who supervise children, but extends it to individuals
who either create a substantial risk of child sex abuse or fail to alleviate

240. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13L. In finding that the scope of the New Hampshire childendangerment statute was not greater than that of the MPC statute, the court in Yates supported
its conclusion by noting that the legislature changed the actors referenced because it sought to
eliminate redundancy in statutes, and the New Hampshire statute retained the MPC language
related to a duty of “care, protection, or support.” For further discussion, see supra notes 180–83
and accompanying text. Unlike the New Hampshire statute, the Massachusetts statute does not
retain the MPC language related to a duty of “care, protection, or support.” Compare N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 639:3, I (LexisNexis 2015) (including only “person[s] . . . purposely violating a duty
of care, protection or support to [a] child), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13L (containing no
language addressing an individual’s duties).
241. For further discussion on what supervisory priests knew about child sex abuse committed
by lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 43, 50–53 and accompanying text.
242. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 73 (recommending, based on its
investigation of the Philadelphia Archdiocese, that supervisory priests be held to a recklessness
standard under child endangerment).
243. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13L (lacking any mention of supervision in the statute).
Child-endangerment statutes based on the MPC, on the other hand, include the requirement that
the individual be responsible for “supervising the welfare” of a child. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 230.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
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one when there is a duty to do so.244 Thus, individuals like supervisory
priests, who often did not directly supervise children, would be covered
by the Massachusetts statute.
Finally, the Massachusetts statute only criminalizes recklessly
failing to alleviate a substantial risk of child sex abuse when the person
had a duty to act.245 The duty question exists both in the Massachusetts
statute and the MPC child-endangerment statute. Neither state that
used child-endangerment statutes to prosecute supervisory priests and
the Church seriously analyzed the duty requirement in the statute: New
Hampshire assumed that the supervisory priests had a duty to
children,246 and the Pennsylvania courts never reached a duty
determination because they decided the issue on the “direct
supervision” element.247 But the MPC child-endangerment statute and
statutes based on it likely refer to a different duty than the one in the
Massachusetts statute. First, as noted above, the MPC childendangerment statute applies to a “parent, guardian, or other
person . . . [who] violat[es] a duty of care, protection or support.”248
The individuals to whom the duty could apply and the type of duty that
applies are both narrowed in the MPC child-endangerment statute.249
In contrast, the Massachusetts statute applies to anyone and refers
to a nonspecific duty.250 Supervisory priests, by virtue of their ability to
control the employment, assignment, and discipline of offending
priests, could be said to have breached a duty to protect minor
parishioners when they had knowledge of credible child sex abuse
allegations against an offending priest and failed to alleviate the risk of
harm that priest posed to children. Alternatively, continuing to employ
a priest against whom there were credible allegations of child sex abuse
or transferring the priest to another parish without disclosing those
reports to the new parish may be considered creating a substantial risk
of child sex abuse. In light of supervisory priests’ authority over the

244. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 265, § 13L.
245. Id.
246. For further discussion of this interpretation, see supra notes 181–85 and accompanying
text.
247. See Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 823 (Pa. 2015) (noting that the court did not
think it needed to engage in an analysis of whether the supervisory priest owed a duty of care to
the abused children); see also supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text.
248. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4.
249. For further analysis of the MPC state, see supra notes 180–83, 239–40 and accompanying
text.
250. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13L.

WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1188

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/30/2017 11:38 AM

[Vol. 66:1149

abusive priests and their responsibility to investigate allegations of
child sex abuse, supervisory priests would likely have a duty to minor
parishioners under the Massachusetts statute.251
Enacting statutes similar to the Massachusetts statute is likely the
best way to hold supervisory priests liable for their egregious conduct
toward children. In addition to legally encompassing supervisory
priests and their conduct, the statute punishes supervisory priests with
up to two-and-a-half years of imprisonment. Because the statute
specifically targets individuals who create or fail to alleviate a
substantial risk of child sex abuse—a close fit with supervisory priests’
wrongful conduct—the blameworthiness associated with the
Massachusetts statute is commensurate with the moral culpability of
supervisory priests.
D. Continue Prosecutions Under Legally Sufficient Statutes
Finally, if states do not enact statutes similar to Massachusetts’s
statute, prosecutors can simply continue prosecuting individuals under
obstruction-of-justice statutes, delinquency statutes, and mandatoryreporting statutes that include clergy as mandatory reporters.
Although those statutes fail to reflect the moral culpability of
supervisory priests, some accountability is better than none at all—
especially if the threat of prosecution leads to institutional reforms and
more protections for children.
CONCLUSION
Supervisory priests played an active role in concealing reports of
sexual abuse by offending priests and knowingly created substantial
risks of sexual abuse to children. The drive to hold supervisory priests
accountable led prosecutors to turn to statutes that either did not
match the moral culpability of supervisory priests or did not legally
encompass their misconduct. Child endangerment matches the moral
culpability of supervisory priests’ misconduct, but child-endangerment
statutes modeled on the MPC do not cover supervisory priests or their
acts. Though supervisory priests chose to ignore and suppress reports
of child sex abuse by lower-ranking priests, prosecutors may not
shoehorn misconduct into statutes that do not legally cover it. Instead
of breaching the supervisory priests’ constitutionally guaranteed notice
by charging them under MPC-based child-endangerment statutes,
251. See supra notes 6–10, 43, 50–53 and accompanying text.
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prosecutors would be better off encouraging state legislatures to pass
statutes that both legally cover the conduct of supervisory priests and
adequately reflect their moral culpability. In the absence of
amendments or newly enacted statutes that meet these criteria,
prosecutors should settle for statutes that represent a lesser degree of
moral culpability, such as contributing to the delinquency of a minor or
mandatory-reporter statutes. The protection of children from future
institutional concealment and enablement of sexual abuse is
paramount, and enacting statutes that hold accountable supervisory
priests and others in like positions will go a long way to deterring
similar conduct and ensuring that nothing like the Church’s child sex
abuse crisis happens again.

